Yi-Hsuan Huang
Research Agenda
My research builds on feminist theory and democratic theory. I investigate issues related to individual agency and unequal power relations in democratic settings. Check out my research below.
Democratizing Exclusion
In my dissertation Democratizing Exclusion, I counter the general view that democracy can only include rather than exclude participants, arguing that exclusionary mechanisms (i.e. mechanisms that consciously limit individuals or groups’ political participation, even partially or temporarily) can be democratically legitimate when protecting democratic individuals’ equal opportunities to make a meaningful impact on policy formation. I identify four exclusions as democratically defensible: deterring harmful behaviors, defining membership, capping political power, and correcting systemic political inequality. I discuss specific uses of exclusion devices in the following articles.
(Funded by National Institute of Social Science and the Ministry of Education in Taiwan.)

Democratizing Exclusion
Can democracy exclude participants from its political process? This chapter democratizes exclusion in normative political theory, arguing that participation restrictions are legitimate when used to protect democratic individuals as equal common world-makers. I distinguish two kinds of exclusions: right limiting (i.e. formal rights limitations) and power-limiting (i.e. resource or influence limitation) and argue that the former can only be used when the target intentionally undermines others’ equal political agency. In addition, I identify four exclusions to be democratically defensible: deterring harmful behaviors, defining membership, capping positional power, and correcting structural political inequality. Finally, I note that since promoting equal agency is context-dependent, a legitimate exclusion needs to be context-sensitive.
(Presented at APSA 2023. Manuscript available upon request)

Muting the Liars: A Democratic Response to Disinformation
Disinformation has become a growing threat in democratic politics, but its regulation may infringe on the principle of free speech. This article defends the democratic legitimacy of regulating disinformation. I offer a normative framework that distinguishes disinformation from similar problematic speech, “false opinion” and “toxic persuasion.” Disinformation should be treated as intentional lies seeking to manipulate collective decisions and hence does not warrant protection. Regulation is normatively legitimate and desirable when used to safeguard citizens’ ability to function as meaningful decision-makers in the democratic common world. I then suggest a two-track identification system to reduce disinformation. Paired with periodical reviews, transparency requirements, and an independent appeal system, my proposal offers normative principles for democracies to balance between protecting free speech and regulating disinformation.
(Accepted at British Journal of Political Science. Manuscript available upon request)

Defending Exclusion: Solving Overrepresentation in Legislatures
Overrepresentation is often treated as the flipped side of underrepresentation in the literature on representation equality. In this article, I argue that this assumption implies a false symmetrical relationship, which overlooks an important distinction between the two. A group need not possess multiple disadvantages to be underrepresented, but groups that are overrepresented often possess a shared set of advantages. Therefore, overrepresentation should be understood as the political dominance of homogenous groups with certain socioeconomic advantages. To improve the equity and fairness of the legislative process, I argue that democratic parties can
employ exclusion mechanisms to limit the legislative presence of the overrepresented.
Finally, I maintain that exclusion measures need to operate on an intersectional basis, and can only be justified when structural inequalities are clearly identified.
(Online First, European Journal of Political Theory; Read the article here)

Dealing with a Tainted Past: Understanding Lustration as Democratic Exclusion
Lustration, a law or policy that excludes individuals complicit in past state-sponsored injustices from democratic public institutions, is often criticized for legitimizing unjust political exclusion. In this article, I offer a democratic exclusion defense for lustration. I argue that instead of seeing lustration as a tool for retributive justice or democracy-stabilization, it should be understood as a form of disqualification. Democracies can legitimately pose constraints on who gets to represent the collective. Lustration, when defending and abiding by the equality principle, can be a legitimate form of democratic exclusion.
(Presented at APSA 2022)
Women's Power Loss as Active Agents
This line of research asks how political theory can better theorize women’s power loss in the context of systemic oppression. The conventional understanding of agency usually presumes action in some form, whether agenda-setting, choosing, or implementing decisions. When students of feminism assess women’s agency in a collective decision-making process, they tend to focus on the extent to which women are able to act—to influence the agenda, propose preferences, or impact the decision. But this account fails to recognize how activeness sometimes can also be a sign of power-lacking. For instance, women tend to act more than their male counterparts in determining, executing, or monitoring progressive public reforms and private household chores. In the context where activeness represents a result of limited power, feminist reformists might need to consider inaction as a form of resistance.
(Invited book chapter. Manuscript in preparation)
Yi-Hsuan Huang
Ph.D. in Political Science
Visiting Assistant Professor
Swarthmore College
yhuang6@swarthmore.edu